Did New Labour 'save' the English NHS? A ten-year retrospective, 1997-2007

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Motu Public Policy Seminar, 17 April 2008


Outline

- The NHS in 1997
- Impact of two main phases of reform
- Characterising (English) NHS policy, 1997-2007
- Verdicts on the period and a balance sheet
- Some implications for New Zealand

State and perceptions of the NHS in 1997

- Recent high profile failures of clinical quality & oversight
- Long waits
- Shabby infrastructure
- Low spending by EU/international standards
- Perception of lack of investment, under-capacity
- Poor outcomes comparatively
- NHS in jeopardy, limited time to 'save' the Service

The four NHSs of the UK




Characterising 1997-2007 in England

Two main phases:

- 1997-2002
 - Command and control, targets, performance management ('targets and terror')
 - NHS Plan 2000
- 2002-2007
 - Large increase in spending gradually leading to capacity increases
 - Gradual shift towards Blair's 'self-improving' NHS to ensure continuing good use of resources




A&E access




% of people seen with 4 hours in A&E (despite 20% increase in attendances)


% waiting > 12 months England & Wales: 1999 - 2003



% waiting > 12 months England & Wales: 1999 - 2005



% patients waiting for hospital admission > 12 months




Source: Are improvements in targeted performance in the English NHS undermined by gaming: A case for new kinds of audit of performance data? Gwyn Bevan and Christopher Hood, British Medical Journal (forthcoming)

Category A calls < 8 minutes (England)




% within 8 minutes




Trends in NSF clinical targets for myocardial infarction

1.17a Managing acute myocardial infarctions, England and Wales 2002-5



Variation in clinical outcomes



The return of the market: towards a 'self-improving' NHS

The re-invented NHS market in England, 2002-

Money following the patients, rewarding the best and most efficient providers, giving others the incentive to improve

(transactional reforms)

More choice and a much stronger voice for patients

(demand-side reforms)

Better care
Better patient
experience
Better value for
money

A framework of system management, regulation and decision making which guarantees safety and quality, fairness, equity and value for money

(system management reforms)

More diverse providers, with more freedom to innovate and improve services

(supply-side reforms)

Current structure of NHS in England





Figure 1.1 The structure of the new NHS in England

Progress in implementing market reforms after 2002

- Slow implementation, some incoherence
 - clinical engagement problematic
- Choice
 - 44% patients offered choice of hospital for first O/P appt., Nov 2007
- 'Payment by results' (national output-based pricing)
 - transparent, some efficiency incentives, incentives to 'cherry pick' & for low cost providers to increase output, no link to quality
- Commissioning
 - weakest link, efforts to strengthen
- Provider plurality
 - small increase in private involvement (electives, GPs) as effective signal to NHS incumbents

But continued focus on targeted areas

Inpatient and outpatient maximum waiting times



Targets & terror

Real resources arrive

Latest waiting time information

- Current standards (since Dec 2005)
 - Maximum 26 weeks for inpatient admission
 - Maximum 13 weeks for 1st outpatient app^t
- Latest data (29 Feb 2008)
 - 74 patients waiting >26 weeks for inpatient admission
 - 45,900 waiting >13 weeks for inpatient admission
 - Fallen 72.4% since Feb 2007
 - 91.6% of inpatients waiting <13 weeks</p>
 - Median inpatient waiting time 4.2 weeks
 - 113 patients waiting >13 weeks for first outpatient appointment
 - Median outpatient waiting time 2.2 weeks
 - 98.0% of outpatients waiting <8 weeks</p>

Progress against 18 week target

- Current waiting target (since July 2004)
 - No one to wait >18 weeks from GP referral to hospital treatment
- 82% not requiring admission treated in <18 weeks (January 2008)
- 69% of those admitted for treatment waiting
 18 weeks

Progress against target for CVD as a whole

- Target to reduce mortality <75 yrs by 40% (March 2000) met five years early (Feb 08)
- Due to improvements in thrombolysis, use of statins, more cardiologists & cardiac surgeons, more facilities
- Also shorter waits
 - No one waiting >3 months (>5,500 in 2000)
- Accelerated the underlying downward trend

Characterising the period, 1997-2007

- Hyper-activity and impatience
 - 'saving and modernising the NHS' (Klein, 2006; 187)
 - 'the most ambitious and comprehensive effort to improve quality in any country' (Leatherman and Sutherland, 2003) with positive but uneven results
 - state of permanent revolution, occasional incoherence (e.g. GP out-of-hours)

Characterising the period II

Innovation


- in wider government processes (e.g. PSAs, Social Exclusion Unit, PMDU, consultations, political devolution)
- in DH (e.g. managerial influx, clinical 'tsars', less ministerial direction)
- in health agencies (e.g. Modernisation Agency, NICE, Healthcare Commission, NPSA, etc)
- in types of provision (e.g. walk-in centres, ISTCs, Sure Start)
- in contracts (QoF P4P)
- in information routine, accessible comparative performance data against standards & targets, patient surveys

Characterising the period III


- Pragmatism
 - willingness to use a range of tools and levers ('what works is what counts', including market forces)
 - 'learning by doing' rather than implementing a blueprint
- Unprecedented generosity in funding
 - in return for 'modernisation'
 - increased funding drove greater radicalism for fear that resources would not achieve government goals

NHS expenditure in current and constant prices, 1991/92-2007/08

(Martin, Smith & Leatherman, 2006)



Total expenditure on health per capita in US\$ PPPs in selected OECD countries, 1997-2005



Source: OECD

Concerns about productivity: GPs

- 56% pay rise for many GPs 2002/03-2005/06
- QOF (P4P) scheme too easy
- Fall in crudely measured productivity of 2.5% per year, 2004 & 2005
- But does not take into account quality improvements and fundamental change in GP remuneration


Plans announced to measure patientreported outcomes (PORTs) routinely to help with productivity analysis

Spoilt for choice

NHS productivity, 1999=100

- Output including value of health and adjusted for quality
- ----- Output adjusted for quality
- —— = Output as measured now

Solid line: Lowest inputs growth Dashed line: Highest inputs growth



Characterising the period IV

- Greater interest in other countries
 - Especially comparisons with continental Europe to make the case for action (e.g. cancer survival)
 - less confidence in NHS 'exceptionalism', hence interest in non-government providers
 - growing scope for intra-UK policy learning

UK cancer mortality rates in international comparison, 1997-2004



Source: OECD

Diverse verdicts on the period

- Civitas (2006) significant improvements in targeted areas but serious weaknesses elsewhere & internationally still relatively weak
- Paton (2006; 2007) fundamental incompatibilities between main policy streams & intellectually superficial
- King's Fund (Thorlby & Maybin, 2007) NHS has been 'saved', with many achievements, but far from 'transformed' in eyes of a sceptical public
- Oliver (2005) closer to a free, universal, comprehensive service than ever

Towards a balance sheet, 1997-2007

Resources (£s, staff, infrastructure)	+++ (50% real since 2002, ≈9% GDP)
Output	+ (+11%, +20% day, +7% elective)
Unit costs	++ (wages)
Measured productivity	-?/+? (-7.5% to +8.5%)
Responsiveness (waiting, access, user views)	+++
Quality (e.g. mortality, outcomes)	+ (++ in some areas, esp. ca, stroke, MH)
Health (inequalities)	+ (-)
Relative performance vs. other European systems (public's view)	+ (-?)

Implications for New Zealand

- Much more limited range of policy tools used in NZ
 - & arguably fewer likely to work?
- More money is scarcely ever a 'solution' (e.g. big variations in performance remain, productivity issues, rest of UK NHS)
- Public views unrelated to performance
 - little political dividend over period required to make gains
- Difficulty of 'steering' in the public interest and encouraging 'self-improvement' (e.g. via markets, professional good will)
- Much less focus on waiting in NZ
 - 3,894 patients waiting >6m for 1st specialist assessment, Dec 07 (Eng 74 patients)
 - Average wait for electives 67.9 days, 2007/08 to date (Eng ≈30 days)